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FOREWORD: COMMENT ON THE NEW
YORK BAIL STUDYt
Caleb FooteWhat to do with an accused between his arrest and his trial has
long posed one of the most puzzling problems in criminal administration.
At least from the time of Plato ' the institution of bail has been a
recognized method by which we have attempted to resolve the clash
between the danger that the accused will abscond and his rights to
prepare his defense and not to be subjected to punishment prior to a
conviction that may never eventuate. Through this use of financial
incentive as a deterrent against flight we have sought to maintain our
"traditional right to freedom before conviction. .

.

. Unless this

right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence,
2
secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning."
In theory, at any rate, our policy of conditional release pending
trial is probably the most liberal in the world. Unlike the British,8
a danger that the accused will engage in criminality in the interval
before trial ' provides no justification for denial of bail, either directly
t New York Bail Study, published infra p. 693, was carried out by seven students of the University of Pennsylvania Law School with the co-operation of the
New York City Department of Correction and was financed by a grant from the
Fund for the Republic. The students were George J. Alexander, Melvin D. Glass,
Michael P. King, James S. Palermo, Frederic M. Reuss, John W. Roberts, and
Allen G. Schwartz. The project was administered by the Institute of Legal Research,
University of Pennsylvania, and the work was done under the supervision of Associate Professor Caleb Foote of the Law School and Associate Professor Marvin Wolfgang of the Department of Sociology.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
1. "The prosecutor, in a murder-charge, must at once demand bail from the
defendant; and the latter shall provide three substantial securities-as approved by
the court of the judges in such cases-, who guarantee to produce him at the trial,
and if a man be unwilling or unable to provide these sureties, the court must take,
bind and keep him, and produce him at the trial of the case." 2 PLAro, LAws 261
(Bury ed. 1952).
2. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
3. E.g., Rex v. Phillips, [1947] 32 Crim. App. R. 47.
4. It is significant that countries which use this reason for denying bail usually
phrase it in terms of fear that the defendant will commit "another" crime while on bail,
which of course assumes that he is guilty of the first offense for which he is still to be
tried. See, e.g., Yugoslavia Code of Criminal Procedure of 1954, art. 182 (pre-trial
confinement): "3) if exceptional circumstances should justify the fear that he will
repeat a criminal offense ... ." (Emphasis added.)
(685)
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or by the subterfuge of setting prohibitively high bail. Unlike continental
procedure, "a danger that the accused may, by destroying material or
other evidence of the offense or by influencing witnesses or accomplices,
make it more difficult to ascertain the truth" " is irrelevant in determining the question of pre-trial release. Bail setting is to be a delicate adjudication whereby the court will require only so much financial securityand no more-as will insure the defendant's appearance for trial; 6 and
"the spirit of the procedure is to enable [defendants] to stay out of jail
until a trial has found them guilty." ' Beside the fact that such a
policy is implicit in the presumption of innocence, the soundness of
our theory will be apparent to anyone who contemplates the almost
insuperable difficulty of trying to contact witnesses and prepare and
finance a defense from the enforced idleness of a prison cell.
Where the defendant or his close relatives are financially responsible, the bail system as a means of achieving this end probably works
tolerably well, for the accused has the means to obtain conditional
liberty until trial and the danger of risking his financial security doubtless exerts some deterrent pressure against flight upon him. Especially
if white collar crimes are excluded, however, a majority of those accused
of more serious crimes today are probably indigent' and are thus not
amenable to the threat of bail forfeiture, for they cannot fear losing
what they do not possess. Applied to this class of defendants, it would
be reasonable to suspect that the traditional bail system would break
down and would place courts in the dilemma of releasing the indigent
accused without any financial deterrent against flight or of keeping him
imprisoned simply because he is indigent.
How serious the bail system's deficiencies have become under
current urban conditions with their large load of indigent defendants
is graphically demonstrated in the New York bail study which is
published herein. Before turning to its merits, it should be noted that
this study is a striking example of a small but growing trend in legal
research. Beginning in 1951, the University of Pennsylvania Law
School undertook a policy of subsidizing summer research by selected
students. Besides its value as an educational device, the result of this
policy has been, in addition to the present bail report, the production
of ten studies on varied aspects of the factual administration of the
5. Federal Republic of Germany, Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 112(2).
6. E.g., F4. R. Cpim. P. 46(c).
7. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951).
8. E.g., in Philadelphia the Defenders Association estimates that they handle at

least half of all serious cases.
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law.9 Produced at a nominal cost,"° this research policy has shown a
remarkably high return on the dollar. These publications demonstrate
both that a wide range of problems in the administration of our legal
rules can be researched at very low cost and that law schools can
make a major research contribution through such utilization of their
students."
The New York bail study is the most ambitious of these summer
research projects, and in addition to its research importance it has
significant ramifications for legal education. Although imprisonment
is both an end product and an interim concomitant of criminal prosecutions, the amount of significant interaction between the legal profession
and correctional administration has been negligible. Many of the
deficiencies of jail administration, particularly at the local level, can
be traced in part to the surprising lack of concern on the part of the
bar for the development of a detention and correctional system which
will make a maximum contribution to the law's urgent concern for
the reduction of recidivism. If the penal system is inadequate, that
fact will negate much of what can be accomplished by an efficient administration of the criminal law. All too frequently a correctional
program is the whipping boy of budget-cutters because it lacks the
community support required to protect itself. As the legal profession
is deeply involved in the problem of criminality and has a special
concern for the value of individual dignity, it is logical to look to the
lawyer for the development of such support; in its teaching of criminal
law administration, legal education should therefore inculcate such
a sense of responsibility in law students.
In sponsoring the New York bail study the Fund for the Republic
and Commissioner Anna M. Kross of the New York City Department
of Correction hoped that the project would also serve as a practical
9. Note, PhiladelphiaPolice Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. Rzv.
1182 (1952); Note, The Administration of Divorce: A Philadelphia Study, 101 U.

PA. L. Ryv. 1204 (1953); Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of
Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. R v. 1031 (1954); Note, Criminal Registration
Ordinances:Police Control Over PotentialRecidivists, 103 U. PA. L. ZRv. 60 (1954) ;
Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. Ri. 1057 (1955); Foote, VagrancyType Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. Rtv. 603 (1956); Note, The Philadelphia Constable, 104 U. PA. L. Rtv. 508 (1956); Note, Administration and Enforcement of the PhiladelphiaHousing Code, 106 U. PA. L. R v. 437 (1958); Note, Preliminary Hearings on Indictable Offenses in Philadelphia, 106 U. PA. L. Rtv. 589
(1958); Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 106
U. PA. L. REv. - (1958).
10. Previous studies have been financed by the Thomas Skelton Harrison Foundation, the Wiley C. Rutledge Memorial Fund for Studies in Law Enforcement and
Individual Liberty (contributed by Jacob Kossman, Esq.) and the school's Alumni
Annual Giving.
11. For an example of the application of the same policy in another law school,
see Note, Metropolitan Criminal Courts of First Instance, 70 HAiv. L. Rlv. 320
(1956).
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demonstration of the educational values available when law students
are brought face to face with correctional problems. In addition to
research duties, each of the seven student participants served for three
weeks as a uniformed officer in detention prisons, under a program that
gave each student experience in a number of different aspects of prison
administration. This direct, behind-the-scenes education proved to be
very significant, and the development of such summer internships for
law students would appear to be a practical and stimulating way of injecting concern for prison administration into a legal education.
Seven men with only a summer to spend on the job cannot exhaust
a subject of such scope as the administration of bail in a city the size
of New York. Despite such limitations of time and manpower, however, they have completed what is unquestionably the most authoritative
study ever made of the effects upon the accused of the institution of
bail.' The work is based on a sample of more than 3,000 cases, comprising about half of the felony prosecutions instituted in three of New
York City's counties in 1956. What effect would have resulted from
the extension of the study to misdemeanor cases or whether what is
representative of New York felony practice is also true elsewhere
cannot, of course, be established from this study and must await
further research. 3 It seems probable, however, that the most striking
finding would be generally true of urban areas: that the deficiencies of
the bail system operate to deprive half of all felony defendants of their
pre-trial freedom, and that as many as three-fourths of those accused
of some of our most important crimes like burglary or robbery are
jailed pending trial.
If conditional release pending trial is to be the norm under out
system of criminal prosecution,1 4 this study makes it obvious that New
York's administration of bail is falling far short of that goal. The
authors of the study pinpoint some of the causes of this failure. They
show how the law imposes needless technicalities which serve to delay
or deny bail. For those who cannot post bail, they illustrate how, in
the administration of the detention prisons, restrictions caused by
crowding and insufficient financing handicap the imprisoned accused
far beyond the limits of what would be required solely to achieve ade12. Cf. B gz ,, Tian BAIL SYSTnrM IN CHICAGO (1927), which is almost exclusively concerned with protection of the state's investment against "straw" bail. An
earlier University of Pennsylvania study in Philadelphia was based on less adequate
statistics. Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1031 (1954).
13. Cf. the similarity of the New York findings with those of the earlier Philadelphia study. Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in
Philadelphia,102 U. PA. L. Rev. 1031 (1954).
14. See text at notes 2, 7 supra.

1958]

COMMENT ON THE BAIL STUDY

quate security. Indeed, the most ironic finding in the whole study is
the revelation that accused persons, whom our law presumes to be
innocent and who are not to be punished, are confined pending trial
under conditions which are more oppressive and restrictive than those
applied to convicted and sentenced felons.
Another major contribution is the statistical data which gives us
for the first time reliable information on the relationship between the
levels of bail normally set for various crimes and the ability of defendants in different criminal categories to make bail at the differing levels.
It has been implied that the amount of bail "usually fixed" for a
particular category of crime is prima facie reasonable bailY This
data shows how far removed customary bail is in fact from bail that is
reasonable in the context of the ability of most defendants to meet it.
Either the judges who set bail are unaware of these trends or they
are deliberately setting high bail in order to impose pre-trial imprisonment. The study suggests that both explanations play a part, and
proposals are made for more reasonable bail setting practices, for
increased use of release without financial security and for better conditions for the untried prisoner.
To the extent that the high level of bail required by New York
judges and their negligible use of release without financial security are
due to the fact that they are unaware of these statistics, the facts
revealed by this study should constitute a major impetus for reform.
But if the policy of high bail is a deliberate one, the prospects for
significant change in the fate of the indigent accused under the bail
system are not very bright. The indigence of many defendants and
the short time span before an appeal against deliberately high bail
would become moot preclude the likelihood that appellate review can
provide the needed corrective influence."0 As for the study's proposal
for better jail conditions for those who are detained, expensive reforms
for the benefit of unpopular minorities unfortunately have little practical
appeal.
It would appear that the impressive statistics which have been
compiled warrant some much more drastic inferences than the proposals
for improved bail administration advanced by the authors of the New
York study. The findings suggest that no adjustments made within
the traditional confines of the bail system can resolve the ugly fact that
our pre-trial criminal administration today discriminates according to
15. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
16. The inadequAcy of appellate policing of bail setting is suggested by the fact
that, although "excessive" bail is prohibited by all states, either by constitutional provision (46 states), or by statute (Vermont) or judicial decision (Illinois), in 25 of
the states there appear to be no reported decisions relating to the amount of bail.
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economic status. No system of conditional release which places exclusive reliance upon financial incentives can be justified under conditions where indigents, transients and others without economic
security constitute so large a proportion of the defendant population.
The fact that the New York study found that even for those for whom
bail was set at the purely nominal figure of $500 the result was pre-trial
imprisonment in twenty-eight per cent of the cases bears eloquent
testimony to the existence of a hard core of defendants who can offer
no reasonable financial security whatsoever. Of course the bail system
tries to adjust to such a contingency, and one of the traditional bailsetting standards is "the financial ability of the defendant to give
bail." 17 It would be possible to adopt the interpretation of the Korean
Code of Criminal Procedure that "the court shall not fix bail money
beyond the financial ability of the accused." :8 Our courts, however,
have not so construed it, 9 for the obvious reason that such a construction really abolishes the bail system by granting freedom to most
accused with no financial sanction at all or with one that would be
regarded as wholly inadequate in more serious cases.
Our law has not distinguished itself in the protection of indigent
defendants, and even such an obvious factor as the necessity of counsel
if there is to be a fair trial has received gingerly treatment in cases
arising under the fourteenth amendment."0 Moreover, the application
of the equal protection clause to the problem has, until recent years,
been conspicuous by its absence. The dawn of a more realistic approach, however, may be seen in Griffin v. Illinois " where the Court
ruled that an indigent state prisoner cannot be denied an otherwise
available appeal because of his inability to pay for the required transcript. Also significant are the holdings that, where state remedies
which must be exhausted are inaccessible to a state prisoner because of
his poverty, he can nonetheless bring federal habeas corpus. 2 Doubtless
denial of appellate or federal review because of poverty is a more
extreme situation than the denial of conditional release pending trial to
17. FLn. R. Cals. P. 46(c).
18. Korea, Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 98(2), translation in

YEARBOOK OF

HUMAN RIGHTS 184-89 (1954).

19. E.g., Ex parte Malley, 50 Nev. 248, 256 Pac. 512 (1927).
20. A state is required to provide an indigent defendant with counsel only where
"there are special circumstances" showing that otherwise a fair trial could not be had,
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 677 (1948), although recently the "special circumstances"
requirement has been liberalized, e.g., Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350
U.S. 116 (1956). In contrast, many other countries make the right absolute. E.g.,
Holgado v. People (Supreme Court of the Philippines, 1950), reported in YtARBOOK
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 230 (1950).

21. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
22. E.g., United States ex rel. Embree v. Cummings, 233 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1956).
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an accused because of his poverty, but there are strong similarities between the two situations. As denial of an appeal leaves unresolved
questions about the validity of a judgment, denial of conditional release
affects the quality of a defendant's trial by impairing his ability to prove
his innocence. The indigent or near-indigent accused is seriously
handicapped at best in this respect, for he is often thrown back upon
an overworked public or volunteer defender and no public funds are
available for investigative purposes.
We cannot get around the
situation that a rich defendant is always going to be in a preferred
position because of his ability to hire the best lawyer and to pour
money into the search for evidence, but from such a fact we should
not rationalize a denial to the poor accused of even such succor as can
be had from self-help. There is always the possibility that a poor
defendant, if given conditional release, can find employment in order
to finance otherwise unavailable legal or investigative assistance.
Clearly then, the spirit of the Griffin case ought to control our
policy of conditional release for indigent defendants. The words of
the Court, applied in the context of the denial of a transcript, are equally
relevant to the accused who because of his poverty is denied conditional
release:
"Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording
equal justice to all and special privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law. There can be no equal justice where
the kind of a trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has." 24

The trial handicap which detention imposes on the poor defendant
is not limited to the pre-trial preparation of a defense. In addition to
the determination of guilt or innocence, the criminal trial process also
involves the sentence to be imposed on the convicted. Among the most
interesting of the findings made in both the New York study and an
earlier Philadelphia bail study is that defendants on bail are placed on
probation three times as frequently as defendants coming to court
from a detention jail. As a matter of statistics this is inconclusive,
for the many variables involved preclude any direct cause-and-effect
argument, but, as the study points out, it is consistent with common
sense. A bailed defendant who can come before the sentencing court
23. "Such are the coercions of poverty that a decent sensible lawyer may well
advise an innocent man, too poor to obtain essential defense evidence, to bargain with
the prosecutor to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser crime than that with which the
defendant is charged." United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion of Judge Frank). See also Address by Judge Frank, ABA Diamond
Jubilee Meeting, Aug. 26, 1953, reported in 15 F.R.D. 93, 100-01 (1953).
24. 351 U.S. at 19.
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and argue that he is currently holding a job and supporting his dependents has a status favorable to probation which pre-trial imprisonment destroys.
There is also an additional factor in the conditional release problem which was not present in the Griffin case, but which also involves
an implicit violation of the spirit of equal protection. The bail system
reflects the importance attached to the prevention of punishment for
an accused who turns out to be innocent.25 At present, however, this
policy has practical effectiveness only on a discriminatory basis. This
invidious class distinction will remain in the absence of some means
to accomplish for the poor what the bail system can do for the well-to-do.
It would appear, therefore, that the statistical contribution of this
study poses a challenge to the law to develop methods of insuring
appearance which will protect the state without requiring a violation
of the spirit of equal protection. An important factor in reducing the
state's risks would be the provision of a speedy trial. The fact is that
we do not afford such speedy trials today, but the failure of the state
to provide machinery for rapid adjudication of criminal cases hardly
gives that same state clean hands in arguing for pre-trial imprisonment
to protect against risks which it could mitigate. The study suggests a
statute making it a criminal offense for an accused to fail to appear in
court after due notice,"8 and the argument that this would be an adequate alternative rests on the fact that most people whom the police
If such sanctions
really want to find are sooner or later apprehended.
provision
of
speedier
trials
are
insufficient
to
bring
all accused
and the
to justice, it must be remembered that the bail system itself rests on
the premise that admission to bail "is a calculated risk which the law
takes as the price of our system of justice." 28
25. The proportion of detained defendants who are ultimately never convicted
will reflect the efficiency of magistrates and district attorneys in screening out weak
cases at the preliminary hearing level. The high proportion of actually guilty defendants shown in the New York bail study is a commendation of New York prosecutive efficiency. In Philadelphia the proportion of jailed defendants who were not convicted was somewhat higher. Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration
of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1031, 1052 (1954) (18% of jailed defendants not convicted). In many jurisdictions the figures may be much higher. See
Van Vechten, Differential Criminal Case Mortality in Selected Jurisdictions, 7 Am.

Soc. Rzv. 833 (1942).

26. See Bail Study at p. 722 infra. See also statute proposed in Note, Compelling
Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia,102 U. PA. L. RZv. 1031,
1073 n.157 (1954) ; the same suggestion by a New York grand jury, N.Y. Times, Dec.

13, 1956, p. 38, col. 3.

27. E.g., only seven escapees from federal prisons between 1937 and 1954 were still
missing in 1954. Bennett, Evaluating a Prison,293 ANNALS 10 (1954).

28. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951)
Jackson).

(concurring opinion of Mr. Justice

